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Constitutional Law: Constitutional Basis for Requiring
Compensation of Court-Appointed Attorney Representing
an Indigent Criminal Defendant-A "Taking" of Private
Property for Public Use?
The federal district court for the District of Oregon, appointed
an attorney to represent Edward Dillon, an indigent criminal
defendant, upon a motion to set aside his prior conviction and
sentence.' Upon completing his services, and pursuant to the
suggestion of the court appointing him,2 the attorney petitioned
for compensation for his expenses and services. The court gave
judgment for the attorney against the Government, holding that
the appropriation of expenses and services from a court-appointed
attorney constituted a taking of private property for public use
for which the fifth amendment of the federal constitution requires
the payment of just compensation. Dillon v. United States, 230
F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
At present most states have enacted statutes specifically au-
thorizing payment to court-appointed attorneys.' In states with-
out such statutes, the great majority of courts asked to order
1. Represented by his own counsel, Dillon initially pleaded guilty to an
armed robbery charge and was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. He
moved for a new sentence under FED. R. Cnim. P. 35, alleging that the
prosecutor had promised to recommend a ten-year sentence if he pleaded
guilty. This was denied and Dillon, now without counsel, moved to set aside
the judgment of conviction and sentence pursant to 28 US.C. § 2255 (1958).
Dillon was again denied relief and his request for court-appointed counsel
at the hearing was refused, but on appeal the case was remanded with direc-
tions to appoint counsel. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
On remand, now represented by court-appointed counsel, Dillon was resen-
tenced to 18 years imprisonment. Dillon v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 948
(D. Ore. 1963), 230 F. Supp. 487, 489 & n.1 R(D. Ore. 1964).
2. Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487, 494-97, app. A (transcript
of appointment proceeding).
3. As of 1961, 39 states had statutes authorizing payment to attorneys
appointed to defend indigents in capital cases, while 30 states had such
statutes for less than capital cases. Celler, Federal Legislative Proposals to
Supply Paid Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 Mum. L. REV.
697, 699 (1961). See also BRoWNEI,, LEGAL Am m THE UNITED STATEs, app.
C. (1951).
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payment to an attorney appointed to defend an indigent have
refused to do so.' This result has been justified on the grounds
that an attorney, as a member of the bar and an officer of the
court, has a duty to give freely of his services when so requested,
and that the expenditure of government funds to pay court-
appointed counsel is a legislative function with which the courts
should not interfere." -
The Dillon decision is the first to apply the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution in determining whether court-
appointed attorneys are entitled to compensation.7 In examining
the Attorney General's contention that only Congress can au-
thorize the expenditure of public money to compensate members
of the bar called upon to represent indigent criminal defendants,
the court held that it had the power to order the United States
to comply with the dictates of the fifth amendment.8
4. See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 847 (1943); Annot., 180 A.L.R. 1489 (1941).
Indiana, Wisconsin, and Iowa have awarded compensation to court-
appointed. attorneys without statutory direction. The Indiana constitution
dictates: "No man's particular services shall be demanded, without just
compensation." IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21. Since the accused has the right to
counsel, Inn. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18, the Indiana courts hold that a contract for
compensation must be implied. See Knox County Council v. State ex rel.
McCormick, 217 Ind. 498, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940). See also Webb v. Baird, 6
Ind. 18 (1854), often cited for its dictum to the effect that an attorney has no
obligation to serve gratuitously as counsel for an indigent. A similar argument
prevailed in Wisconsin. See County of Dane v. Smith, 12 Wis. 585 (1861). In
Iowa the court reached the same result by an opposite approach, holding
that since an attorney has an obligation to serve, he has a right to be com-
pensated. See Hall v. Washington, County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
5. E.g., Whedon v. Board of Supervisors, 192 App. Div. 705, 183 N.Y.
Supp. 488 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99 (1879);
Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 188 P.2d 825 (1948); Presby v.
Klickitat County, 5 Wash. 89, 81 Pac. 876 (1892).
6. See, e.g., Wayne County v. Waller, supra note 5; Presby v. Kiekitat
County, supra note 5. A further argument advanced is that a court may not
order payment from the county treasury to discharge a state function. See
Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62 (1860); Board of Comm'rs v. Mowbray,
160 Ind. 10, 66 N.E. 46 (1908); Pardee v. Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 482,
118 Pac. 122 (1911). Because of statutory provisions calling for payment
of other officials of the court and omitting compensation to attorneys, courts
have refused to find that -the legislature impliedly intended to compensate
appointed counsel. See Arkansas County v. Freeman & Johnson, 81 Ark. 266
(1876); Yates v. Taylor County Court, 47 W. Va. 786, 85 S.E. 24 (1900).
7. In Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 478 (Iowa 1850), the fifth
amendment protection against taking private property for public use with-
out just compensation was used by analogy in support of a decision allowing
compensation to a court-appointed attorney.
8. 280 F. Supp. at 491.
CASE COMMENT
Although the Dillon result is certainly desirable, the court's
extension of the eminent domain clause to reach it seems un-
warranted. To appropriate the services of an attorney for the
defense of a criminally accused indigent may well constitute a
"public use" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. The
sixth amendment of the Constitution guarantees to the criminally
accused the right to counsel. To implement this mandate the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require federal courts to
assign counsel to the indigent accused,' and recent pronounce-
ments by the Supreme Court have established the indigent de-
fendant's right to court-appointed counsel at both trial"o and ap-
pellate" levels as an indispensable element in furthering the
public interest of according justice to everyone accused of crime.
It is not clear, however, that a court-appointed attorney's
services constitute compensable "property" within the meaning
of the fifth amendment. The framers of the Constitution prob-
ably envisioned the eminent domain clause as applying primarily
to real property." 'Troperty" has been extended to apply to
some relatively intangible personal property interests such as
patent rights" and lienholders' rights," but there are apparently
no reported decisions holding personal services to be compensable
property interests. Nevertheless, since an attorney's services
represent his earning power and have an ascertainable value,
the instant court may have been justified in determining the
services to be compensable property.
A more serious problem concerns the court's finding that the
appointment of an attorney constitutes a "taking" of his services
within the meaning accorded that term in the fifth amendment.
Reasonable qualifications may be required of a prospective at-
torney before he is permitted to practice law." Typical legitimate
requirements are that the applicant must have graduated from
9. FED. R. Cm. P. 44 provides:
If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him
at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without
counsel or is able to retain counsel.
See also 78 Stat. 552 (1964), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (Supp. 1964).
10. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
12. See 1 Awxws oF CoNGREss 660-65, 703, 717, 729, 757 (1791-1793).
13. See United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1895);
United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
14. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
15. 230 F. Supp. at 493, citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 2892 (1957), and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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an accredited law school" and that he must become a member
of an integrated bar.17 The service of indigent criminal defend-
ants by court-appointed attorneys has been regarded as "one of
the obligations incident to [an attorney's] professional status and
privileges."' The long history of this practice makes it reasonable
to conclude that attorneys must obligate themselves to so serve
upon request as a prerequisite to admission to the bar. Having
thus entered this profession, an attorney does not suffer a fifth
amendment "taking" when his services are subsequently appro-
priated.? Focusing on the nature of the attorney's service as
an essential governmental function, the propriety of holding
performance of this function a "taking" is doubtful, particularly
in view of decisions holding performance of other essential gov-
ernmental functions such as jury duty"0 and military service2 '
are not compensable.
Compensation for court-appointed attorneys is a desirable
aim. The attorney performs services having recognized com-
mercial value and thereby aids in promoting the public interest
in equal justice. Since a benefit is conferred on the public, the
public as a whole should bear the expense rather than impose
it upon the individual attorney. Compensating court-appointed
16. See Hennington v. State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 393, 291
P.2d 1108 (1956).
17. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
18. DRNKER, LEGAL Emcs 62 (1953).
19. Similarly, enforcement of an appointment should not constitute "invol-
untary servitude" as proscribed by the thirteenth amendment. Of. Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328 1(1916); Armins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service
Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legis-
lation, 49 CoRNn L.Q. 228, 237 (1964). The Court in Butler said the thir-
teenth amendment "introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services
always treated as exceptional . . . ." 240 U.S. at 3383.
For authority for the proposition that a court may compel an attorney
to serve his appointment, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 1
CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 700 n.4 (8th ed. 1927) contains the
following: "Said Chief Justice Hale in one case . . . 'if we were to assign one
of them as counsel, and he was to refuse to act, we should make bold to
commit him to prison.' Life of Chief Justice Hale, in Campbell's Lives of
the Chief Justices, Vol. II." See also Note, 76 Hav. L. REv. 579 (1962), in
which a survey conducted by the authors indicates that 90% of the federal
district judges feel they have the power to compel an attorney to defend a
prisoner who could not, by himself, obtain counsel.
20. See Commers v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mont.), aff'd,
159 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 807 (1947).
21. Of. Neely v. State, 63 Tenn. (4 Baxt.) 174 (1874), construing the
clause of the Tennessee constitution providing for just compensation for
taking of property or services.
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attorneys would also make it more likely that indigent defend-
ants would have competent counsel. Even without consciously
slighting his indigent client, an appointed attorney cannot ignore
demands made on his time by paying clients." Further, an at-
torney giving his time, whether compensated for it or not, is not
likely to make the additional out-of-pocket expenditures on in-
vestigation of facts often necessary to a thorough defense?3
Shortly after the instant decision Congress enacted the Crim-
inal Justice Act,"4 which requires each United States district
court to implement a plan providing representation for crim-
inally accused indigents by private attorneys, attorneys furnished
by a bar association or legal aid agency, or some combination of
these plans?" Attorneys appointed pursuant to the plan are to
be compensated for expenses incurred and services rendered inci-
dent to the defense. Compensation is to be a maximum of 15
dollars per hour for time spent in court and 10 dollars per hour
for time spent out of court, the total not to exceed 500 dollars
in felony cases nor 300 dollars in misdemeanor cases. In extra-
ordinary cases additional compensation for protracted repre-
sentation may be paid?" The statute also provides compensation
for persons other than counsel who render services on the defend-
ant's behalf.27
If the eminent domain approach in the instant case is correct,
then the fee schedules set forth in the Criminal Justice Act are
beyond the power of Congress. It is well recognized in eminent
domain cases that only the judiciary may determine what com-
pensation is just?" Thus the legislative and constitutional ap-
proaches would be inconsistent since Congress is not empowered
to determine compensation rates under the fifth amendment. The
Dillon decision was motivated, at least in part, by impatience
resulting from the failure of Congress to act." The implicit recog-
22. Cf. Celler, supra note 3, at 698; Note, 76 HAnv. L. REV. 579, 589
(1962).
23. See 280 F. Supp. at 491; S. REP. No. 2261, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); Celler, supra note 3, at 712; Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel
in Minnesota* Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Mn.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1964); Note, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 589 (1962).
24. 78 Stat. 552 (1964), 18 U.S.C.A. & 3006A (Supp. 1964), amending 18
U.S.C. § S006 (1958).
25. 18 U.S.C.A. § soo6A(a) (Supp. 1964).
26. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(d) (Supp. 1964).
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (Supp. 1964).
28. Monangahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327--28 (1893)("when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is
judicial").
29. 230 F. Supp. at 491 n.3 and accompanying text.
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nition of the Dillon court that Congress could properly enact
the proposals that became the present Criminal Justice Act -
including the fee schedulesso - indicates the court's own inse-
curity about the applicability of the fifth amendment to attor-
ney's services.
Aside from the constitutional infirmities of the Dillon decision,
the Criminal Justice Act appears to be the better solution for
the admitted problem on practical grounds. The bar does not
view the statutory rates as unreasonables' and since the rates
are lower than the market rate2 less strain would be imposed
on the treasury. Furthermore, the fixed statutory rates make
the Criminal Justice Act much easier to administer than the
eminent domain approach, which requires an ad hoc determina-
tion of the value of each attorney's services.
Administrative Law-Contempt: Federal Agent
Convicted of Contempt for Following Agency
Head's Instructions Not To Testify
Plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court to enjoin
the agent in charge of the Chicago office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation' from keeping the plaintiff under a harassing sur-
veillance. During a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, the plaintiff's attorney called the agent as an adverse
30. Ibid. In criticizing the pending bill the court noted only that it did
not appear to cover post-conviction and collateral proceedings such as in
Dillon. The act could be so construed if the representation from time of
initial appearance through appeal provided by the act is viewed as a time
span applying only to the trial proper. In view of the act's purpose to provide
paid counsel whenever needed, it would seem more appropriate to read it as
applying to representation through appeal in the case of any proceeding. See
Letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to The President, March 6,
1963, in 13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3048, 3049 (1964) emphasizing that
counsel is guaranteed "at every stage of the proceedings, commencing with
the initial appearance . . . ." However, the Judicial Conference takes the posi-
tion that the act does not cover habeas corpus or § 2255 proceedings. JUrcIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNTED STATES, REPORT ON THE CRmnxAL JUSTICE ACT
11 (1965), in 85 Sup. Ct. No. 10.
31. See AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N STANDiNG Comm. ON LEGAL Am AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AND THE NAT L LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER Ass'N,
GuiDELINES FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE SYSTEMS 11 (1964) (model legislation).
32. Dillon's counsel was awarded $35 per hour. 230 F. Supp. at 494.
1. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, was also
named in the complaint as a defendant, Appendix for Appellant, p. 1, Giancana
v. Johnson, 385 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964), but the complaint against him was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. p. 284.
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